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"FECI1NICAI, MI',_I() RAN l)liM
LOXIGOX RELATEDFAILURES DURING
SPACE SHUTTLEMAIN ENGINE DEVELOPMENT
SUMMARY
The various types of Iox/gox related failures encountered in the Space
Shuttle Main Engine prog."am have illustrated tile nee(i for extreme caution
in designing an(l fal)rieating systems for high pressure high flow oxygen
systems. The selection and processing'of structural materials are critical
factors in component (levelol)ment. The fnilures encountered have been
resolved nnd appropriate cimnges mn(le to ensure safe operation with respect
to the use of high pressvre oxygen.
IN'rROI)UCTION
Throughout the (levelopment nn(l testing" of rocket engines an(1 related
hardware, n variety of component failures has linen _ttribute(l to reactions
of materials with li(lui(ior gaseous oxyg'en.
"the Marshall Space Flight Center. l)cenuse of its role in rocket engine
development, has been n pioneering organization in research on liquid and
gaseous oxygen eomt)atibility with materials. The researeh dates back to
the predecessor organization, the Army l]allistie Missile Agency, during the
early 1950's development of the Re(lstone and ,lupiter missiles, and subse-
quently the lnrge Saturn rockets ti_at wero u.se(t in the Apollo program.
The Space Shuttle Main Engine (tevelot)ment program has ha(t the bene-
fit of past experienee in designing for hi_'h pressure lox/gox applications:
yet, for several l,'ensons, failures have l)eell (.'ncountere(l (lurin_ the develop-
ment phase of the pr(,?,'r:_m. Test fncility pr,oble, ms hnve bee, n eneotlnlered
because of the use of existing test e(luipment not spo, cific,_lly (lesituled for
the higher presst_res of the SSMF,. Some c,mq_on(,nl fnilur()s have cx_curred
becau.qe of extrem()lv hif_'h fl()wr:}tos of ()xvff,,n throtlg|l (lll(:ts and wdves
which were not fully optimize(I lo r(,(llu'_, t'h_w in(Itlce(I vihrntions.
This rep()rt (le,_erihes in narrnliv(, form the st_(.,'ifi(." fnilures encountered,
and discusses sorne of the e()rrec',tive gl_,liolls l:lken 1() l_revenl or r()(t,]c.e the
potential of |'tllur(" l'alilures.
|"AI I,URI{ tll STOI_.Y
The following ehronolog-y lists the sig'nifieant failures that have
occurred :
1) March 1975- Santa Susana Coca 4 Facility Valve
2) February 1976- Santa Susana Coca 1A Facility Valve
3) r,lareh 1977- Engine 0003, High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Primary Seal
4) June 1977- Santa Susana Coca 1B F,leility Valve
5) September 1977 - Engine 0004, llig'h Pressure Oxidizer Turbo-
pump Instrumentation
6)
7)
8)
9)
I0)
II)
12)
April 1978 - Engine 0002. Injector l,ox Posts
June 1978 - Engine 0005, Injector I.ox Posts
July 1978 - Engine 0101. High Pressure Oxidizer Pump
September 1978 - Engine 0005. l,ox High Pressure Duct l:lowgxlide
December 1978 - Engine 0007, lteat Exchanger
December t978 - Engine 2001, Main Oxidizer Valve
February 1979 - Engine 0201, Main Oxidizer Valve Seal.
FAI I, URE DESCRIPTIONS
March 1975 - Santa Susana Coca 4B Facility Valve
On March 7, 1975. an SSME Powerhead test (014) was underway at the
Rocketdyne Santa Susana Test Facility in l,os Angeles. California. when tile
test was terminated by an explosion. The test ol_i('etive was to complete '_
preburner ignition and main combustion chaml,er iLnlition. The failure
resulted in moderate to extensive dam,_ffe to s(,x'cr:d ('om;,t_nent_ of the
assembly. Most of the damage resulted from n combtlstion wave propagating
through the system from the ignition of mixed ffas(,_. t the nozzle ,,xit.
Figure 1 is a simplified schematic of the tost n_s,_,;l,]v, ltowevor, tho pro-
pellant feed lines contained numerous b'dl valvo_ . ;liters, and flowmaters,
as shown in Fig'ure 2. which is an isometric scl.,m:,tic of the e;×i(lizer system.
Note the flow of Iox from tho fox tank to tho nx-i,iiz(,r prei)tlrI_er (OPB).
LB-7 is a 2 in. 7t_00 series Annin valvo tlso.(I _i_ :t lox l)1(_o( ' valve, nnd is
located on a stub line to tile main flow line. A schematic of this valv,, and
associated components and materials is shown in l.'ig't_re 3. This particular
valve was found to have a t)tlrned bonnet seal (Teflon). There vms no evi-
dence of significant prior contamination. Note that the wdve was installed
such that lox/gox pressure was over the ball. The downstream valves were
reversed, with the low pressure under the bali; thus. protecting the stem
paekingand seals from exposure to fox while in the closed position.
It was concluded that primary velocities nnd surges in the unprimed
stub bleed line. caused by m_dn line surg'es, could have resulted in pres-
sures of 20,000 psi and velocities of 400 ft/see. This would have resulted
in high temperatures, generated by atiiatmtic _ox compression in the stub
line. Temperatures on the ortter of 1220°F were calculated because of this
effect. The ignition temperatu,'e of Telqon at 30(}0 psi is approxinmtely
850°F. The Teflon seal was n static bonnet seal (Royce) of TFE Teflon with
an internal spring, used between the cop and betty of the valve. The spring
and seal were burned: no other damage (recurred to the valve. No other
cause, other than adiabatic compression, was found to explain the Teflon
ignition.
The explosion and major assembly damage were not attributed to the
Teflon ignition in the valve but to surges and overpressure in the system.
The Teflon ignition was caused by the pressure surge because of erratic
main lox valve opening, and the installation of the valve such that the Tef-
lon was exposed to the surge pressure.
Corrective action involved ehnnging the main wlve opening instrumen-
tation, serve systems instrumentation, redesig,nl of flowmeters to withstand
higher surge pressures, redesigm o|" filters, and reversal of several Annin
valves to protect seal areas from pressure surges while in the closed posi-
tion.
February 1976 Santa Susans C_a 1A Facility Valve
On Fehruary 4, 1976, _, verification lest of the SSME l,ow Pressure
Oxidizer Turhopumt_ (I,POTI'):_nd the High Pressure Oxidizer Turtmpump
(HPOTP) was t)ei,ag conducted qt the l{oekettlv_m Sant'J Susans Coen IA
Test Facility, when :l fire ,_curre(l :,1 nl)t)roximately 14 see into a programmed
mainstage duration of a 35 see test. Mm:h of lh_, total tiam_e to the test
hardware and the test stand resulted from _tlstadned burning of hy(lraulie
oil from a rut;tured manifold and llll,in_ stlpplyinL_ the contr(_l valves.
The I,POTP sustained minor internal damqffe. The IIPO'I'P was exten-
sively damaged throughout. Facility lines nnd v;dv(,s downstream of the
IIPOTP were ruptured nnd burned lhrou_h in s,,v,,r;_l areas. "i'h_,se parts
were damaged hv lox fires, but most of the test stand (lamgtt_'e was a result
of burning of lh_, spilled hydrmllie oil.
A simplified schematic of tile test hardware ix ._hownin Fiv,ure 4. The
test set tip _lIlft annotations as to post tvst ()l_servations are sll,,w_ in Fip.'ure
5. Extensive burning occurred in the SA-5 Annin Throttling wive. as
illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. Also, damagewas observed in a '.'lowmeter
(LA-7I). The meter lost two adjacent rotor bl'tdes: ;i retaining ring was
dislodged; and two anti-rotation pins were missing (Fig. 8 and 9).
The 6-in. diameter flownleter, nlade by Flow Technolo_;y, Inc., Tempe.
Arizona, was of 1970 vintage and ha(l been previously used in _levelol)ment
testing (16 tests and 413 see test time). The ten blade rotor w_s SAE 9:_10
steel, nickel plated. Most other parts were 302 and 304 CIIES. FollowinLr the
failure, two adjacent blades were missing; the 308 CRES anti-rotation pins
were missing'; the 440C CRES rotor bearing was free, but rough running:
and the Sprialoe ring, which hel(t the fh)w straighteners in place, was out
of its groove and bent over the downstream vanes. Analysis of the rotor
blades simwed them to be ANS 6260 aircraft quality 9310 steel, with a hard
ness of RB 93-96. Some globular oxides ml(t sulfides were evi(lent in the
mierostructure, and the material showed a typical air melte(1 structure.
Failure in both blades initiated at the lea(linp" face. The lea(ling failed blade
had numerous scratches from sanding and a portion of the fractured e(lg'c
followed a large scratch. The fractures were prim;wily cleawtg(: type. and
were found to be identical to sample.s broken in the laboratory I)y bending
LN 2 soaked specimens. Some other blades on the rotor were _lightly under-
cut at the root: the second fraetured blade was 0.0001 out of sf)ec: nnd
part of the fracture ran through this area (Fig. 10). Stress calcul'_tions
on the blade showed that the combined torque load on the blade and a load
calculated from the impact of a loose anti-rotation pin would at)preach the
yield strength of the alloy.
The 6-in. Annin valve was of typieal construction an(l _as used as a
throttling valve with a fail open mode. The pol_pet ,_haft _oal._ were on the
low pressure side of the valve. The valve body mat(,rinl was .R16 CRES and
the lip seal of the valve was an integral part of the lm,ly. The pot,l)et
material was also 316 CRES, containing an AMPCO ahlmintlm bronze :eal ring
which mated against the 316 body for sealing. The t)oppet shaft rode in an
aluminum bronze bushing and was sealed by a l):lth'rv of Teflon chevron
seals in the shank.
The Grayloc fittings at each end of the :\nnin _alve h;,_t 316 CRES tlubs
welded to the valve body. The T-seal was 17-,1 ph CRI.;5; coal_,_l with 'l'of-
Ion and the clamps were 304 CRES.
The accident investigation board concluded that ttw pr(,_mhle cause of
the accident was the loss of blades from tht, I,A 71 f:,eility flnwm,,ter and
subsequent ignition from the impart of tlm I)lades v.'itI_ down._tr(,am (,nmpo
nents, prolmbly the SA-5 valve. It was alsn c<_n_'ltl_l(,d that tt_is valve
operated with a cavitation condition just ,Iownstr_,:,m nf tilt, throat. "tt_i_,
condition would tend to propagate tmrnin[.r nn:;e !Knit!on cK'e,_l'r_,(I. "i'h_'
resulting internal fire wouhl restrict flow frcm_ _lle III'OTI' (,;lusin!._ oxc'e,_sive
presmlres in the ducting, loss of flow ill the t)reburner primp, b_ih:_equent
overspeeding and fire, and cavitation in the lll'()'rl ) leading to ovcrspeeding
and fire. Hydraulic lines usc(l for contrc)l of serve w,lves were severed and
the spilled hydraulic fhiid cause(I ._ccon(tarv (t;,nmge l() the test stand and
associated instrumentation.
Significant corrective actions taken as ;i result of this acci(lent were as
follows :
1) The flownieter was redesigned t(; mininlize the risk of blade break-
age and loss of pins an(l retainer rings (hie to mechanical vibrations.
2) Revised procedures were iml);emente(l in the ol)eration of throt-
tling wilves. The procedures were de,,elol)ed to minimize valve position
changes during" high Iox flow conditions, cavitation conditions were avoided;
and additional screens were employed to intercept l'oreilg'nparticles.
3) More stringent inspection t)i'oee(tures were employed to reduce
the risk of outside contamination entering the system.
4) Additional structural sut)ports were ad(le(t to reduce flow induced
vibrations.
5) The design of the hydraulic oil system was modifie(l to permit
quick isolation in case of a fire on the stand.
6) New and improved instrumentation cabling and protective covers
were designed. Spray-on and fiend on insulations were extensively employed.
7) Additional instrumentation was a(l(le(I to (leteet abnormal flow,
vibration, or temperature conditions.
(]eno.r;il lternarks
No positive conclusion was reache(t :is to the direct initiator of this
accident, although nlanv l)ossible contributors were studied. Laboratory
impact tests of the flowmetcr hhi(les in lox demons/rated l|iat igrnition could
nave occurred because of this fnihire mechanism. C:tleulations also showed
that cavitation "_n the throttling valve could Imve been severe enough to
cause igllition from ;l(lial)ati(? compressir)n, eSl)e(.'ially if small particles of
contaminants were present. ,lust (lo_nstream of the throttling vqlvc, a
Grayloe fitting" was coated with Teflon. Vibrations in the system were
calculated to be of sufficient magnilil(h, to }1;t\'o (';lus(,d :ill if.,mition ;it the
seal mating faces, if some cop, ta,_linant had I)l,()l/ t)resl,nt to resillt in a
Itx_alize(lreaction. Some traces cf s:intlmid oil,or cotltaiminants were found
in the ducts, probably intro(hiced (luring _lss,,Iilt/lv fir (tilting modifications.
Any of th(,,<,e factors c(,tll(! have causo(l lhe tir,, : }mwover. the conclusions
reaehe(! I)y the inv(,stif_ation w_,r(" llase(I ell ttl+, in(ist lotxical sequence+ of
events ;is COll.,_lrlleted frolll l|lo evid(,licl,. \l:t!:,," i'tllll)_t's wore rll;itle ill lho
system during roaolivation to oliinillat,, rll,l,_i ,if th,, t)r-blems menlioiied, and
no further difficullies were eneotlilterf, d durillf, t the enstlinl_ test program.
March 1977 - Engine 0003 - High Pressure Oxidizer Turbot)un, t)
Primary Seal l:ailurc
On March 24, 1977, duringa test of SSME Eng'ine 0003. at Test Stand
A- i, National Space Teehnolog-y I,aboratory (NSTI,) at Bay St. l,()uis,
Mississippi, a fire occurred in the area of the high pressure oxidizer turbo-
pump (tlPOTP) at approximately 74 see into the test.
The planned test duration was 520 sec and the test was planned to cover
various power levels. Test designation was 901-II0.
The first indication of a problem was the obserwmce of _lfire at the
exit of the Io× primary seal cavity drain tube followed by a large fire at
the lox turbopump which engulfed the engine. The engine controller initiated
cutoff of the engine and the test facilityfirex system suppressed the fire
within 30 sec.
A schematic of the HPOTP is shown in Figure 11. The major exlernal
fire damage is illustrated in FigaJres 12. 13, and 14. Because of the exten-
sive internal burning of the turbopump, the task of determining the specific
cause of the fire was very difficult, as is usual for lox fire accidents. Man\"
possible causes were considered, analyzed, and fMlure scenarios developed
and studied.
The investigation board was unable to positively identify the actual
origin of ignition. Extensive post accident laborntory tests nnd experiments
were conducted at Roeketdyne and at MSFC to simulate component opera-
tional conditions and to determine safety m'u'_,_ins and sensitivities ,_f the
various components to ignition. The sources that were determined to have
the potential of causing ignition were:
1) Loss of hydrodynamic lift in the primary lox seal, causing rubbing
.of a carbon seal against a stainless steel mating ring, creating frictional
heat and ignition of the carbon composite, l:i?._r'c 15 il!ustrntes the eonfigll
ration of the primary seal area of the HPOTP. and the assnciated ,naterials
of construction.
2) Primary oxidizer se,ql bellows (Into 71_) wel(t faihlre, ,'_llc_wir_[r
oxygen leakage.
3) Ignition of the interface of the bellows :rod its vibration ,lampez'
as a result of friction.
4) Contamination in the se'il cavity.
5)
area.
Hot gas leakage past tim intermediate st,nlinto the I_rimarv seal
6) Vibration of the carbon seal a_:,inst th,_ mating ring.
iI
6
7) Insufficient intermediate seal purge -;_ ,
8) Dimensional tolerances in the seal area.
Since no direct cause could be identified, desig_ changes of major
importance were implemented to correct all deficiencies defined. A new
primary seal concept was employed usint4" a labyrinth concept, and the carbon
seal concept was eliminated.
The experimental studies supporting this investigation are briefly
described below :
The major materials used in the IIPOTP seal package are listed in
Table 1. Oxygen compatibility for each material was confirmed by labora-
tory tests under the cnvironmen'al conditions experienced. Three exten-
sive studies were made: (1) ignition studies of the primary lox seal carbon
(P-692) ring by rubbing and overheating: (2) ignition of the thin metal
bellows (Inco 718) by fretting against the damper ring', fatigue failure, or
adiabatic compression of trapped oxygen gas: nntt (3) particulate contami-
nation of either carbon seal or bellows, producing" fresh surfaces and local
hot spots under the dynamic use conditions. Post accident examination
showed that tlv" metal bellows and damper spring had burned completely,
but the carbon seal was only partially burned.
The laboratory tests were desii_,'ne(lto study the combustion character-
istics of the two materials involved. The results were as follows:
Summary of Carbon Seal Tests
1) The P-692carbon material autoigrnites at 560°C in 0 2 at one atmos-
phere under normal equilibrium conditions
2) It is possible to ignite carbon P-692 bv it4"nition of adjacent in-
contact Inconel 718 in 400 psi t}2"
3)
50 psi 0 2
4)
718 foil.
Once ignited, P-692carl)on will normally su._tain combustion in
at room temperature.
Burning P 692 carbon can also ignite adjacent in contact Inconel
5) An excess quantity ()f li,luid oxygen can ,lUench the combustion
of P-692 carbon.
Summary of Inconel 71_ an(l Inconel X75f)Tests
1) lnconel X750 is consi,lerahlv mor,, (liffi('ult t,) it,mite than Inconel
718 at 400 psi O,_.
2) Once ignited, lneonel 718 (5 mil._) will sislain combustit)n over
50 percent of the time. whether at 50 ¢)r ,If)0 psi O).
3) Secondary ignition of Inconel 718 foil can occur by contact with
burning droplets of Inconel 718.
4) Temperatures near the melting point (2300 to 2500°F) are required
for initial ignition of Inconel 718 in 50 psi oxygen.
5) Rupture of at. Inconel 718 bellows by fatigue vibration, while
exposed to 400 psi 02, did not produce a fire. (However, other tests made
on samples of this material show that ignition can occur under similar condi-
tions if the fresh broken edges are excited sufficiently to result in very
localized high temperature areas).
June 29, 1977 - Santa Susana Coca iB - Preburner Facility
Oxidizer Throttle Valve (SB-I)
Test 018, an SSME Preburner assembly test, was conducted on June 29,
1977, at the Coca 1B Test Facility. The test was planned for a duration of
10 see r_amstage operation. A fire occurred in the preburner main oxidizer
throttle valve during the start transition and there was a subsequent burn-
through of the facility '.ox line.
A sketch of the basic facility system is shown in Figure 16. A sketch
of the SB-I valve seat and stem assembly is shown in Figure 17.
Post-test inspection revealed that the SB I throttling valve plug and body
(4-in. Annin oriented with flow over the plug) were burned at the plug seat
area, downstream of the seat area and the facility ducting downstream of the
valve. The valve body was eroded internally to a depth of approximately
i-in. Figure 18 is a photo of the burned body.
The investigating team for this incident concluded that induced vibra-
t'ion coupled with flow induced erosion of the seat resui*ed in ignition of the
material.
Analysis of the hot fire data for the test series showed that tile SB-1
valve throttling characteristics had changed throughout the test series,
indicating progressive plug erosion. The vibration, induced by cavitation
at the valve seat area, caused intense impact between the plug and se,nt,
resulting in an impact mechanism with fox on a fresh unoxidized ._urfnce of
metal.
The investigation found no evidence of foreiffn contamination in any
associated component. No other material deficien(,i_._ :yore found in any
other part of the system that could have attrih,zt, (I to the SB l valve failure.
There was no evidence of impact from any migratin_ partiele_. No materials
incompatibility was found in the survey; all valve softffoods wcr,, appro
priately batch tested and found acceptahlo.
The valve plug material was Amt)co 18 and the body material was 21-6-9
CRES. Both of these materials had been previously certified for lox service
by testing in 8500 psi gox at 60001 .` and 10 Kgm. Some Teflon flakes (which
came from the valve stem spacer and that were sandwiched between the Ampco
18 and 21-6-9) were tested in 7000 psi gox at RT and 10 Kgm without any
reactions. A study of the heat of combustion of Teflon was made and the
possibility of this material serving as an i_nition source for the metal was
discounted.
Another similar valve was examim,d and evidence of a discoloration on
the plug was noted. This was identified as an oxide film which normally
forms from an exposure to 400 to 800°l:. This indicated that the flow condi-
tions within the wdve are capable of producing sufficient energy to increase
the temperature to a high level.
Thermal studies of the valve showcd that the 1-in. eroded depth of
the valve body could have taken place in approximately 750 reset. This
corresponds to the test parameters and observations.
Corrective actions taken as a result -f this incident were as follows:
1) Valves were reversed in this and similar usages to result in flow
under the plug. This would reduce cavitation and induced vibration, pre-
vent danmge to the shaft seal during shutdown surges, and result in the
valve seat being upstream of any shaft stem seal debris.
2) Clearances of plug and seats were changed to minimize impact
during vibration and dwell times at positions that would permit impact were
minimized.
3) Assembly bolts were modified to provide positive retention.
September 1977 - National Space Technology Laboratory-
Test Stand A-1 SSME Engine 0004 liigh Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
On September 8, 1977, (luring a test firin_ of SSMI': Engine 0004 at the
National Space TSchnolog3, I,aboratory. Bay $1. l,(_uis. Mississippi, a fire
occurred in the area of the high pressure oxidizer ttlrl>opump at 300 see into
the planned duration of 321) soe.
The initial fire was observed ill the IlPOTP inlet duct. This duct
immediately rupt_lred anti sep:lr.itcd from the enizir_e :it the inlet and at an
internally restrained bellows joint as,,;emt)l_,,, _il)proxll_l:lloly two ft upstream
of the HPOTP inlet point. The low pressure puml) housing rupttlred at this
point causing a _eneral conflagration around th,, I,t'OTP and HPOTP area,
resulting in exten_ivo extern',l tnlrning of lho ongine. Tho fire was sup-
pressed wilhin 5 see I)y the facility fircx _x's_om.
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The major damage was confined to the IIPOTP, LPOTP, and connecting
duct work (Fig. 19). The HPOTP was almost completely destroyed by fire;
the LPOTP, as well as portions of the duct work, appeared to have ruptured
from overpressure. Damage to the discharge section of the IIPOTP was less
than at the inlet side. Other small feed lines were ruptured, primarily as
secondary failures because of the extensive burning. Also, many instrument
lines, sensors, and valves were damaged.
The investigating board concludecl that the failure was caused by a
bearing failure in the HPOTP. A load imbalance of the four bearings appar-
ently occurred because of liquid oxygen coolant flow characteristics. The
flow was such that the axial and radial loads on the pump end pair of bear-
ings were not shared, but were concentrated on the inboard bearing. Also,
the inboard turbine end bearing was not cooled adequately to provide satis-
factory bearing life. The board also found inadequacies in the pump rotor
balancing that needed more improvement. A cross-sectional view of the
HPOTP is shown in Figure 20. A sketch of the HPOTP is shown in Figure
21 showing the principal areas of damage.
I. HPOTP Housing - The Ineonel 718 housing h'id accumulated 2693
sec of test time l having been rebuilt several times. No discrepancies we,'e
found to indict the housing as tile cause of failure.
2. HPOTP Shaft - Little damage occurred to the Waspalloy TMP shaft.
It was judged not to have contributed to the failure.
3. HPOTP Turbine Rotor and Blades (Material: Waspalloy TMP
Rotor; MAR-M-246 Hf lql_,des). Both the -_}'stand second stage rotors were
intact and no burning occurred in this area of the turbopump. Many blades
were damaged mechanically by rubbing, caused by bearin_ failure nnd shaft
unbalance, but no blades were missing from tile rotors. Several bolt failures
in the rotors were attributed to high centrifugal forces as th,, punlp oversped
during failure.
4. HPOTP Honeycomb Tip Seals and Interstage Seals - Turbine End -
(Material: _ S-ea_" _s 1-88 _ Incon(_/625i -I_-c-rs}}_ge _-,--_6y
903). The honeycomb seals were destroyed by the blades and the labyrinth
seals were worn away by the eccentric rotation of the shaft anti rotor. No
burning occurred in this area.
5. tlPOTP Seal PackaKe - The primary lox seal labyrinth (KeI-F and
Ineoncl 718) was partially burned. A portion t_f the Kol l: remained intact
in its housing, and the shaft part of the labyrinth was intact and in good
condition. It was concluded that this area w_ls riot t}1(. source of i_nnition.
8. tlPOTP Bearings - (Material 44t_C l_t,ll_ ,,nd Races. Fiffuro 22).
All bearings (Nos. 1 and 2 on the pump end :,n,1 Nos. 3 anti 4 on tim
turbine end) were burned and essentially dt_t,',w_,d except for parts of
the inner and outer races. All balls were mi_.._in_,r and n_somotl tlestrox'ed
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by fire. Examination of the remaining races indicated moderate to heavy
synchronous radial loads and nonuniform wear, indicating an unbalanced
condition. It appeared that the worst fire damage occurred between the
two sets of bearings, in the inducer area. and was more severe on the No.2
bearing side.
7. HPOTP Bearing Cartridge - (Material: Cr plated Hastelloy B,
overcoated with Dry-Film I,ubricant). The pump end cartridge was con-
sumed by fire. The turbine end cartridge was intact. Spalling of the
coating and improper plating were discovered on this cartridge, but this
discrepancy was judged not to have caused bearing failure.
8. HPOTP Main Impeller - (_laterial: Inconel 718). The impeller was
severely burned with only a thick i_ub remaining. Contribution to the failure
could not be determined.
9. HPOTP Preburner Impeller (Material: Ineonel 718). This
impeller was aIso consumed, with only a hub remaining in contact with the
shaft.
Failure Sequence
The most probable failure sequence leading to the HPOTP fire was
concluded to be as follows: The bearings at the pump end received too
much cooling from the lox flow and _he bearings at the turbine end too
little cooling. At the pump end the excessive flow caused unequal axial
loading between the two bearings resulting in the No. 2 bearing (inboard)
carrying approximately 90 percent of the radial loads. At the turbine end,
the flow caused No. 3 bearing (inboard} to carry about 75 percent of the
axial load, and at the same time, the flow was inadequate for proper cooling.
With these conditions, a gradual degradation occurred causing an unbalanced
condition and subsequent vibrations in the pump. The bearings continued
to lose stiffness and the shaft dropped into a synchronous speed range.
Then, the load:, increased significantly, lea(ling to increased degradation
rate of the bearings, eventual rubbing of the shaft and labyrinth seals,
higher lox flow to the pump end benrings, nnd rubbing at the turbine end.
At approximately 300 sec, sufficient heat was generated by rubbing of metal
parts to initiate h fire.
Corrective actions were t_iken to improve the coolant flow in the pump
and to refine the pump balance to equalize benring Ion(Is.
April 1978 SSME Engine {}002 nn,l Engine 00{}5.Main Injector
l:aihlres at National Space Teehnoh,_y T,aboratories
SSME Engine 0002 was undergoing its ninety tldrd mainstage test at
National Space Teehnoloffy l,nl_orntories, ll_w S_. l,mli_, Mississippi, in
April 1978, when failure occurred in the m;,ir_ inj,,clor. The,,n_ine had
acct|mulated 93 tests anti 6125 see tt_tnl (,,st time. _lnti the faihire occurred
at 200 sec into test 901-173.
ll
Damage was limited to a burnthrough of tile injector secondary and
primary face plates, burning of fox posts, and retainer and nozzle tube
ruptures.
Post-test examination revealed a crack in the radius of a fox post, and
several fox posts were bent, up to I/4-in. in line with the outside hot gas
transfer ducts. Some damage was observed on 18 fox posts and retainers.
Cracks were found in the interpropellant plate.
A sketch of the injector and posts is shown in Figure 23. A fox post
illustration and a cross-section is shown m Figure 24. Figure 25 shows
several bent fox posts and Figure 26 shows general damage to the post
tips and injector face.
The investigation of this failure concluded that tile crack in the tip
of lox post No. 77 (in No. 13 outer row) was caused by high cycle fa-
tigue. This particular crack was not a through crack; it had progressed
0.010 through a 0.020 in. wall. The bent posts were caused by high
temperature, high velocity, hot gas impingement. The fox posts were made
from 316L CRES and apparently lacked sufficient high temperature strength
to be structurally adequate. The Inconel 718 interpropellant plates were
cracked parallel to the post axis and the cracks were attributed to low cycle
thermal fatigue. One other post (post 8, row 12) was found to have failed
at the friction weld, on the 316L side, by hot tensile failure, primarily
because of overheating after the burning began. Early in the development
program, the lox posts were made from HS-188, and no bending or cracking
was encountered during testing. The 316r, posts were used after the first
three injectors, since the structural and thermal nnalysis showed them to
be adequate, and considerable difficulties had been experienced in manu-
facturing the HS-188 units. The high loads and temperature effects and
subsequent bending of the 316L posts had not been anticipated.
Laboratory studies made in support of the failure investigation further
defined the fox post vibration frequencies and mode shapes. Dynamic and
structural models were made to simulate the failure mode. Vortex flow
models were made and studied. It was concluded that the fox p,;sts in line
with the outer gas ducts failed first because of higher dynamic forces and
higher temperatures. Thermal bending of the post caused increased tip
loading. Vibration was most severe in the out(,r row of the posts. Conse-
quently, several modifications were made to the main injector, including
the incorporation of larger propellant face plate ;:uts, and }letter GII2
cooling of the fox posts by using larger GH 2 orifices.
June !978 - SSME Engine 0005 Main Iniector r,ox Post Failure
at National Space Technology l,, hor;,tories
Following the failure of the injector po_t_; in Engine f1002, fatigue
cracks occurred in the thread roots of some i,ost_ in Engine 0005. A
through crack developed in one outer row post nnd some burning resulted
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downstream of the crack. The failure was a typical high cycle fatigue
crack, resulting from similar high frequencies, temperatures, and loads
as experienced on Engine 0002. Some face plate cracking and interpropel-
lant plate cracking were also experienced.
Extensive dynamic, structural, and thermo dynamics tests and analyses
resulted in a decision to reinforce the outer row posts in-line with the inlet
ducts to strengthen them. This was done on an interim basis; later the
outer two rows of posts were strengthened by brazing tips of HS-188 alloy
onto the 316L and still later, these parts were changed to an all HS-188
machined post.
July 1978 - Engine 0101 High Pressure Oxidizer Pump Failure at
National Space Technology I,aboratories
On July 18, 1978, SSME Engine 0101 experienced a high pressure lox
pump failure during test 902-120. The test was programmed for 300 sec and
was terminated at 41.8 sec due to the failure. The specific turbopump, No.
0301, had undergone approximately 1280 sec hot firing time in previous tests
on various engines, but had been modified for this latest series of tests with
a capacitance type speed sensor in the pump. There were also some internal
accelerometers and strain gages installed in this unit, with the first pump
so instrumented.
The engine was operating at 100 percent rated power level when the
failure occurred. Damage to the engine war extensive. The low pressure
oxidizer pump (LPOTP) housing fractured and separated with multiple
fractures, but no evidence of primary burning was found in this pump.
The connecting duct work and flexible joillts between the low pressure and
high pressure pumps fractured. All burned segments were concluded to
be caused by secondary burning. The high pressure oxidizer turbopump
(HPOTP) sustained extensive burning, more severe at the pump end. The
preburner end showed relatively little damage. Other minor components
were both mechanically and fire (lama_c(l, as well ,_s many lines nnd instru-
mentation cables. Minor damage to the test stand facility occurred.
Within the H_OTP, there was major (lam'igc and loss of material consumed
by the lox fed fire (Fig 27). l.:ssentinlly all (l_inmge at the turbine end of
the pump was caused by mechanical faih,re during spin down. The turbine
wheels rubbed and (lam:ige(l the l_h1(le_ _everely. The interstage seals were
destroyed by rubbing an(l impact 1,oad._. The turl)ine shaft seal and interme-
diate seal were not burned. The primary fox so_,l :_r(,nwas l_urned exten-
sively, but the KeI-F labyrinth seal wn,_ only ch_,rr,,(l (approximately 95
percent intact). There was no burning down,_tr,,:,m of the labyrinth. It
(lid not appear that the fire initiated in the prim:u'v _eal [)acka_e. but that
fire came through the bearings from the l)lamt, _,n,I area. the be'lrinl_s were
heavily damaged on the pump end. The t':,}',n¢'iior spe,,d sensor device was
completely consumed, as well as the flow l,Jrnin,2" vane._. The inlet area o_"
the housing was heavily burned; the main impeller vanes and shroud as well
as the preburner impeller were (lesirt)ve(l. The prehurner pump housing
was completely I)llrned nw'_r¢ inside ;,rid several hurnthroughs occurred.
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The investigating team concluded that the fire initi:tted in the ar,_t of"
the capacitor speed probe which was inst_dled for R&D purposes only. and
that the fire was most likely the result of rubbing of"tile device _gainst the
rotating shaft. Analysis of the data from this test and from the preceding
test led to the conclusion that a fire had also initiated on the previous test,
but self quenched without _,ny hardware damage.
The capacitor device was studied in detail with respect to construction,
materials, amount of energy to ignite and energy liberated by burning, and
dynamic characteristics. Many other causes of ignition were postulated
and each considered in detail. After consideration of all modes of failure,
it was concluded that the most likely cause of failure was the deformation of
a part of the capacitor device because of high lox flow forces, and subse-
quent rubbing of the deformed part against a speed nut on the pump shaft.
A sketch of the speed device is shown in Figure 28. The mode of defor-
mation is depicted in Figure 29. The materials used in its construction were
adequate for use in fox under normal circumstances. However, small parti-
cles of abraded 303 stainless steel which could result from rubbing of the
speed pad against the shaft nut could be ignited from the frictional heating.
The ignition point in 50 to 800 psi oxygen _vould approach the melting point,
2500°F, but freshly abraded particles could ignite at a lower temperature.
Simultaneously, frictional heat on the probe pads caused by rubbing would
be conducted to the Armalon (Teflon) insulation which could ignite at about
870°F at this pressure. This Armalon ignition would trigger a rapid and
massive combustion of the entire probe and surrounding structure.
Extensive laboratory testing was accoml)lished to support the conclusions
reached by the investigating team. These tests included friction/wear tests,
dynamic flow tests, ignition tests in oxygen, structural testing of the capaci-
tance probe, electrical measurements, and thermal conductivity tests.
One failure mechanism postulated was the rubbing of an Inconel 718
slinger on a mating silver surface (silver plated Inco 718). However.
silver has been determined to be extremely difficult to burn in lox or gox.
It melts and relieves frictional heating long before the combustion tempera-
ture is reached; thus, it is an excellent wear se_11 material.
The speed device has not been used in subsequent engine tests.
September 1978 - Engine 0005 High Pres.gure l,ox Duet Flow Gui,le
During SSME Engine 0005 tests 901 185 nnd 186 _t National Space Techno-
logy Laboratories in September 1978, _,rathe,." un:l_;_1:Hfailure occurred in
a high pressure lox duct. Although an internal fire was experienced, the
burning did no, propagate extensively and "q_l,_,v_r,tly self-extinguished.
The high pressure duet system involved is shown in l:iffure 30. The
flow guide w.qs located immediately Ul),_tre:,m of the main oxidizer valve (MOV).
The guide was made of annealed lnconel 718. The nmjor damage was a cr_ick
approximately 0.8-in. long which was ignitod and melted for about half its
length, as shown in Figures 31. 32. Had 33.
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Examination of the flow guide disclosed extensive cracking around the
circumference because of high cycle fatip;ue. Fi_'ures 34 and 35 show dye
penetrant indications of these multiple but small cracks. The largest crack
had ignited as a result of heat generated by severe vibration and rubbing
together of the fresh fractured surfaces, and some of the metal had melted
and eroded away. The burning apparently stopped prior to engine shut-
down, probably because of quenching by the flow of oxygen through the
burned opening" into a low pressure cavity region sureounding the flow
guide.
Some ignition and burning rate tests at Southern Research Institute
indicated that specimens of materials such as Inconel 718 can burn to a dis-
tance of l/4-in, in approximately 0.006 sec after ignition. Thus, the burn-
ing in the flow guide probably was sustained for an extremely short period,
perhaps on the order of 0.01 sec. The test time for the duct was 290 sec,
thus the fatigue cracks occurred during that time. Scanning electron micro-
scopic examination of the fractured surfaces showed a mixture of melted
material, ductile overload fracture surfaces, and high cycle fatigue fracture
surfaces.
A redesign of this component was made to eliminate the resonance cavity
behind the flow guide, l,ater units were made solid, omitting the cavity.
No further occurrences of this specific mode of failure have been encountered
in this duct.
December 1978 - Engine 0007 - lleat Exchanger Coil Failure
On December 6, 1978. during SSME Engine 0007 test firing 901-222,
at the National Space Technolo_.¢ I,aboratories, a fire occurred in the vicinity
of the heat exchanger discharge line before a premature cutoff at 4.33 see.
The test had been programmed for a duration of 50 sec.
A teardown inspection of the engine, a review of motion picture film,
and data evaluation indicated that the fire initiated in the lox heat exchanger.
Major damage resulted to the heat exchanger, the high pressure oxidizer
pump, the hot gas minifold, and the main injector. No sig_nifieant damage
was sustained by'the test stand. Damage external to the engine was slight,
although major internal damage occurred.
Figure 36 is a schematic of the powerhead showin_" the heat exchanger
location.
Figures 37 through 41 '_'llustrate the damage caused to the heat exchanger
assembly, manifolds, and preburner. The heat exchanger coil was des-
troyed, the preburner liner,_nd wall_ were burned through, and the overall
powerhead was severely burned. The turbine _upport housing in the high
pressure Iox pump was I_urned through t(, th,, internal nozzl_ area.
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The failure investigating board concluded that tile failure initiated
in the heat exchanger, as a result of a leak in the coil. Ignition of the
lox rich plume probably severed an adjacent coil allowing massive quantities
of lox/gox into the turbine exhaust stream. The ignition and detonation of
this lox rich mixture caused a shock extending the damage. The metal/
oxygen fire then extended from the ruptured coils downstream to the hot
gas manifold, to the transfer tubes, and on to the main injector. Subse-
quently the external HEX/gox discharge line ruptured, causing super-
ficial external fire damage: before engine shutdown.
No positive decision was reached as to the cause of the initial heat
exchanger tubing leak; however, several possible reasons were found.
The most likely cause was damage to the coil by an electrical arc during
a local weld repair.
Laboratory tests were made to demonstrate that a weld high frequency
arc jumping between the coils and its supporting bracketry could result
in a pinhole leak. Many welds are made during the course of fabrication
of the heat exchanger unit, thus particular care in welding was specified.
However, it was determined, for one particular series of modifications, that
the welder failed to use the recommended procedure of grounding the
welder to the closest point of the structure to the torch: instead, the
ground was clamped to the external protrusion of the tubing. The resul-
tant electrical path could have caused n pinhole leak by arcing between
the coil and the bracketry, on which the repair was being made.
To prevent future occurrences of this kind, several corrective actions
were taken :
1) Welding procedures were reviewed and techn':ques to prevent this
type of problem were re-emphasized to welders.
2) Improved leak detection methods for heat exchanger coils were
employed.
3) Higher pressures for proofing the coils _ere employed.
4) Modified coil forming methods were developed and new cleaning
procedures used.
December 1978 - Engine 2001 - ,Main Oxidizer Valve Failure
On December 27, 1978, SSME Engine 2001 was tested on "rest Stand
A-1 at the National Space Technology I,aboratorie_. The test was desig-
nated 901-225 and was scheduled to be the final nccct;tance test for this
engine.
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The scheduled 520 see test proceeded normally until 255.6 see when
premature shutdown occurred because of high fuel turbine discha,-ge
temperature. Simultaneously, the main combustion chamber fox injector
manifold ruptured and a general fire enveloped the engine.
The engine sustained extensive damage, internally and externally.
Facility damage was limited to burning of electrical and instrumentation
cables, pneumatic and hydraulic tubing, cameras, and general smoke
damage. No damage to structural members resulted.
Analysis of high speed film and engine data showed that the initial
failure occurred in the Main Oxi¢iizer Valve (MOV). Recovery of the
almost intact valve permitted a detailed inspection and it was concluded that
the burning began in an interface jnint between two parts of the MOV inlet
area due to severe vibration and fretting and ,_ubsequent reaction with fox/
gox. It was apparent that a screw had loosened allowing fine threads to
rub across thin shims exposing fresh metal raised to elevated temperatures
to high pressure flowing lox, leading to ignition.
An overall view of the engine showing the high pressure oxidizer pump
area, and the missing pump discharge duct and main oxidizer valve is shown
in Figure 42. Figure 43 shows the MOV and attached discharge duct as
recovered after the incident.
A cross-sectional of the MOV is shown in Figure 44. Figure 45is a
sketch of the MOV and duct assembly with notations of the damage ob-
served and other observations relative to the failure cause.
Figure 46 is a photograph of the inlet sleeve removed from the burned
MOV. Note the thin shims used at the flange and the eroded flange section
originating at a screw hole. This evidence and other observations led the
failure investigation team to conclude that:
I) The MOV was undergoing severe vibrations due to an acoustic/flow
characteristic of the propellant flow through the valve. (This vibration
characteristic, predominantly in the 7200 Hz range, was later eliminated by
closing the small gap at the inlet flange interface.)
I
2) The A286 steel screw loosened sufficiently to allow fretting of the
mating parts, and the generation of localized heat where the screw threads
fretted against the thin 302 CRES shims in the flange area (Fig. 46).
3) Ignition of the shims occurred and the burning propagated to the
21-6-9 CRES inlet liner and subsequently to the Inconel 718 bellows sur-
rounding the liner.
4) The burning began to erode the downstream duct and simultnneously
increased the pressure in the duct and injector manifold to n pressure
exceeding the strength of the hot |nconel 7lfl ducking, resulting in rupture
of the duct.
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This failure scenario was supported by the pressure/temperature time-
lines in the test. Also, subsequent examinations of other MOV's in different
engines substantiated that the severe vibrations and fretting were occurring
in these units also. Figures 47 and 48 show an MOV inlet liner and bellows
assembly removed from another valve and the evidence of severe fretting
in the flange area. In addition to the design changes made subsequently to
reduce the high frequency vibrations, most allclose fit mating parts in the
valves were dry film lubricated with lox compatible lubricants. Various
types of lubricants were used for the several applications. Inlox 88, a
phosphoric bonded moly-disulfide type was applied to several close fitting
parts; Everlube 811, a silicatebonded moly-disulfide type was used where
thicker films could be allowed.
Discussion
The MOV delivers oxygen to the injector dome at a pressure of approxi-
mately 4600 psia, and the flowrate is approximately I060 Ib/sec. Thus, the
metal/oxygen reaction potential is increased considerably because of this
high pressure and flow. A previous failure incident was described in this
report in which the duct liner immediately upstream of the MOV vibrated and
cracked and subsequently ignited and burned. In that case, the burning
was self-extinguished before any significant damage was done.
Both incidents point to a requirement for extreme caution in designing
components for this level of oxygen pressure and flow. As a general rule,
the following precautions should be taken:
l) Mating parts and maLerials must be carefully selected to avoid
high frictional heat.
2) Care must be exercised to avoid exposure of thin parts to oxygen
because of heat absorption capabilities and burning characteristics.
3) Bolted parts should be torqued correctly with locking fasteners to
prevent loosening and localized impact or fretting of metals.
4) Consideration must be given to the possibility of cracks in thin
metals, which could allow rubbing together of fresh metal surfaces.
Fatigue cracks in thin bellows may be particularly dangerous in high
vibration applications.
5) The use of compatible dry film lubricants car, significantly reduce
metal fretting and wear in close fit design applications.
6) The use of the best fretting resistant met:fl combinations must be
a design requirement where rubbing actions are likely to occur.
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February 1979 - SSME Engine 0201 Main Oxidizer Valve Seal Fnilure
On February 12, 1979, SSME Engine (12()l was tested at Sant_ Susana
Test Facility for a 300 sec duration firing. This was the first test using
S/N 0006 Main Oxidizer Valve (MOV). Following" the successful test, dis-
assembly of the MOV revealed severe erosion of the MOV Kel-F ball seal.
Figure 49 is a cross-section of the MOV showing the loc':ltion of the
Kel-F ball seal• Figure 50 shows the oriKinal configuration of the seal and
Figure 51 is the damaged seal from the 0201 test. Approximately 120 degrees
of the seal circumference remained: the other material was washed down-
stream by the lox flow into the lox dome and injector. The seM appcarcd
to have been heated to the melting point beneath tile surface. Many small
pieces were recovered from the backside of the injector and all showed
evidence of erosion and/or melting.
Examination of the other parts of the MOV showed that many dry film
lubricated parts were worn and impacted in many places. The end of the
ball shaft showed severe wear and galling. The mating guide sleeve showed
evidence of spinning on tile shaft and external wear. TILe seal openinb_
earn surfaces were brinelled to some extent. Instrumentation showed that
the MOV had experienced a 7400 ltz vibration. This pnrtieulnr MOV had
incorporated some desigm change fentures emplo.ve,t to l'eduee these vibra-
tions, but the modifications were not ontirr, lv effective. The energw level
measured in this valve seemed to increqse with test time.
It was concluded that tim K¢'I F seal experience(t internal molting due
to the high vibrational frequency encountered in this test. The material
softened internally although the surface remained solid due to the high
lox flow across it. The internal softening eventually caused sufficient
strength loss to crack the cold brittle thin skin _md subsequent mechanical
failure occurred.
Discussion
This was the first time a fnilure of this nature had ¢x'eurred in SSME
components: however, a re-examination of some parts from l)roviotls tests
showed slight indications of surface heating and cavitation erosion on some
MOV seal s.
The melting temperature of Rel-F is approximately 6tlt)°l: and the ignition
temperature is 640°F at ambient pressures in oxygen. This ig'nition temper-
ature may be somewhat lower at higher pressuro.s. S¢,veral tm_sibh', heat
sources were considered in the course of the inv,'stir.ration ,)f this failure,
SllCh /IS :
1) Vibr,_tm'v po_nding of bM! to senl.
2) Flexing of the bellows ass_,mhl\'.
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3) Friction caused by oxygen flow.
4) Oxygen flow cavitation/bubble collapse.
5) Acoustic whistling
6) Compression heating.
Calculations were made to determine the heat generated in melting the
MOV seal assuming a heat of fusion of 17 Btu/Ib for KeI-F. Other calcu-
lations were made to show that the seal coulL have reached 600°F in 29 to
40 sec, assuming that the heat flowrate was constant. Yet, none of these
calculations accounted for the source of the heat.
To support this failure investigation, high frequency fatigue tests on
KeI-F samples were made at Hydronautics, Inc. These tests showed that,
at a frequency of 8 KIIZ, 0.0003-in. axial amplitude, some local melting
resulted in the KeI-F after I0 sec. The test specimen external surface
temperature reached 170°F in I0 sec.
These high frequency fatigue tests did pot produce overall melting of
the test specimer,s, but served to show that the material could have been
heated to the melting point, even immersed in lox, by the application of
sufficient high frequency energy.
Other laboratory tests supporting this investigation evaluated the
mechanical erosion of a high pressure water "laser" jet on Kel-F, and
several other materials. Water pressure was increased to actually penetrate
a l/4-in, thick Kel-F plate and the resultant damage appearance compared
with the failed KeI-F MOV seal. The eroded surfaces did not compare,
further supporting the conclusion that tb MOV seal had melted, rather than
eroded.
DISCUSSION
The failures described in these narrative accounts are recorded in
detailed reports of Investigation Boards and Failure Investigation Teams.
As a group, these failures can be attributed primarily to the severe
conditions encountered in high pressure high flow oxygen systems. The
dynamic conditions existing in such a system are difficult to determine
with conventional instrumentation and even mor_ difficult to analyze. High-
flow conditions cause complex boundary layer phenomena, gas pockets in
many components, cavitation phenomena, localized friction, _tc. The known
reaction mechanisms of materials with Iox or ffox- _,ecome difficult to relate
to some conditions that exist in a complex, high pressure high-flow systt_m.
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Corrective actions taken for the failures described have involved
design, systems operations, and materials changes. In many cases, ana-
lytical techniques could be employed to direct these changes: in others,
experimental trial and error type programs were implemented to solve
the particular problem encountered.
The impact sensitivity of both metals and non-metals with lox or gox
has been studied extensively by MSFC. In 1980, only tw,o other facilities
in the U.S. were active in routine impact testing of materials: Rocketdyne,
Canoga Park, California, and White Sands Testing" I,aboratories, New
Mexico. All of these laboratories were testing materials in support of the
Space Shuttle development. All three groups have the capability t(,te _t
at pressures up to I0,000 psi.
In addition to impact sensitivity, some oxygen reactivity sensitivity
studies are being made by the National Bureau of Standards, Boulder,
Colorado, under contract to NASA-MSFC. However, there is a paucity
of information available on basic reaction mechanisms, thresholds of reacti-
vity, and inhibiting"conditions. Additional technology must be developed
to support any new desi_,33semploying oxygen systems over I0,000 psi.
With respect to the selection of materials for oxygen systems, very few
materials have been developed specifica,,y for such systems. For the
most part, exmting materials have been characterized for use with oxygen,
not developed for this purpose. Among the metallic materials, there seems
to be little need to undertake the development of new alloys for oxygen
systems of the foreseeable future. This is no'_ the case for nonmetals.
Less reactive seal materials, adhesives, fillers, paints, insulation._, and
protective coatings are needed, as well as mor'e efficient, lox compatible
lubricants.
An initial SSME program guideline was based on the use of s_{_t,-of
the-art materials and processes, and this appre, aeh has been adl',_red to
with ver_ few exceptior:s. No extensive alloy or nonmetallic materials
development progr,_m ha'_ been undertaken: but a very thorough materials
characterizatio:, program has supported the SSME development to _ssure
that the materhd_ and processes use,i provided the materials oompatibility
assurance neces_ary for safe operation.
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TABLE 1
LIST OF MATERIALS USED IN HPOTP PRIMARY SEAL AREA
AND USAGE CONDITIONS
Material
Carbon P-692
Inconel 600
Inconel 718
Inconel X 750
321 CRES
K -Monel
Chromium (Plating)
Usage
Maximum Pressure (psi)
510
510
510
500
400
400
400
Maximum Temperature (°F)
-300
-300
+500
+500
+130
+500
+500
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content. Review of any information concerning Department of Defense
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